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ABSTRACT 
 
Research on electoral participation at the individual level in Latin America remains scarce. Most 
previous studies have focused on the institutional determinants of cross-country differences in 
aggregate levels of turnout. This study provides an empirical examination of the individual-level 
factors that impact citizens’ propensity to vote in the region. I assess the link between citizens’ 
affection for political institutions and turnout using recent survey data from 18 Latin American 
countries from 2004 to 2014. Using logistic models I show that trust in elections, satisfaction with 
democracy, and respect for institutions have a significant effect on voter turnout in individual 
countries. Specifically, trust in elections remains the strongest predictor of turnout among the 
variables of interest. The analysis also confirms the importance of socio-demographic variables in 
explaining voter turnout across the region.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
	
Cross-national studies of turnout among the advanced industrial countries are extensive. 
These have focused primarily on the impact of institutional variables (Powell, 1986; Jackman, 
1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995), rarely looking at individual-level data to understand the 
factors that impact citizens’ participation in elections. Comparative research on electoral 
participation in Latin America at the individual level is also scarce (Carlin and Love, 2015). 
Over the last decade, several scholars have studied the determinants of the cross-country 
differences in electoral participation in the region (Fornos et al. 2004; Pérez-Liñán, 2001; 
Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009), but have mainly relied on aggregate data and have focused 
on the effect of institutional and contextual factors such as registration procedures, compulsory 
voting laws, and concurrent presidential and legislative elections. 
During the last years, comparative studies in the advanced industrial democracies have 
started to focus on the effect that citizens’ attitudes and perceptions towards political institutions 
have on electoral participation (Birch, 2010; Cox, 2003; Grönlund and Setala, 2007). However, 
this type of research in Latin America still remains limited. The purpose of this study is to extend 
the knowledge about the individual-level determinants of electoral participation. In order to do 
this, I assess the link between citizens’ affect for political institutions and turnout using recent 
survey data from 18 Latin American countries from 2004 to 2014. I also evaluate the impact of 
socio-demographic characteristics on the likelihood of going to the polls. In this way, the article 
sets out to contribute to the comparative research dealing with individual level electoral 
participation in Latin America, while testing if the same variables that explain variation in voter 
turnout in the United States and Western Europe are also good predictors of this variation in the 
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region. In addition, I set out to find a general pattern in the variables that explain voter turnout 
across Latin American countries.   
I find evidence that the individual incentives to vote across the region are driven mainly by 
socio-economic attributes, while citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards the political system 
remain significant in individual countries. In particular, the article demonstrates that in some 
countries, citizens who have higher levels of trust in elections, respect for political institutions 
and satisfaction with the democratic system have a higher likelihood of voting. Trust in election 
remains the strongest predictor among these variables. In addition, my analysis shows that across 
the region older, educated and employed citizens are more likely to vote, and that women have a 
higher propensity to vote than men. Furthermore, party identification is one of the most 
important determinants of turnout across the countries. However, I find little support for the 
expectation that citizens with higher income tend to vote more. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes the main theoretical approaches 
that have tried to explain voter turnout in the comparative literature. In the second section, I set 
out the theory and the expected hypothesis. In addition, I describe the data set and the variables 
as well as the method used in the empirical analysis. In the third section, I report and analyze the 
empirical results and the final section concludes and suggests avenues for further research.   
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THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO VOTER TURNOUT IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The importance of voter turnout for democratic stability and the overall health of democracy 
has motivated a large literature that tries to understand why voter turnout varies across countries 
(Powell, 1982, 1986; Teixeira, 1992; Lijphart, 1997). Existing cross-national research has 
focused on the effect of two main groups of variables: institutions and socio-demographic 
characteristics. 
 
				Institutional explanations 
Comparative aggregate-level research has established that institutional variables are the 
strongest determinants of variations in voter turnout. Institutional and political context 
explanations focus on the effect of electoral rules and the structure of the political system on 
voters’ decision-making calculations about whether to vote. The electoral system (Blais and 
Carty, 1990; Franklin, 1996; Radcliff and Davis, 2000), the electoral cycle (Dettrey and 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Fornos et al., 2004), compulsory voting laws (Blais et al., 2003; Fornos 
et al., 2004; Hirczy, 1994; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Power 
and Garand, 2007), unicameralism (Fornos et al., 2004; Jackman, 1987; Kostadinova and Power, 
2007; Pérez-Liñán, 2001), district magnitude, the disproportionality of the electoral system, 
nationally competitive districts and party fragmentation (Fornos et al., 2004; Jackman, 1987; 
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Kostadinova and Power, 2007; Lehouq and Wall, 2004; Pérez-Liñán, 2001) have all been linked 
to voter turnout.  
As regards compulsory voting, the theoretical expectation is that it should increase the costs 
of non-voting, generating incentives to show up at the polls. This relation has been confirmed by 
most studies of turnout in Western democracies (for a review of the studies see Blais, 2006). 
Unicameralism should also lead to higher rates of turnout because citizens will have greater 
perceptions of the decisiveness and the efficiency of their vote. This is because under a “strong” 
bicameral system where both chambers have equal constitutional powers, and where the upper 
chamber has a distinctive basis of election (Lijphart, 1984), laws have to be discussed and 
approved in both chambers, so one of the chambers can act as a veto player. As a result, 
“elections for the lower house play a less decisive role in the production of legislation” 
(Jackman, 1987: 408), and citizens should have less incentives to vote. However, the findings 
about the impact of unicameralism on turnout are mixed (Blais, 2006).  
The causal mechanism linking the electoral system to voter turnout remains unclear (Blais, 
2006). On the one hand, it has been argued that proportional representation (PR) -with high 
average district magnitudes- should have a positive effect on voter turnout due to the higher 
amount of competitive districts. In contrast, in majority systems with single-member districts, 
most districts remain uncompetitive (Cox, 2014). The argument has been that in competitive 
districts parties should have more incentives to mobilize the electorate, so countries with a higher 
number of this type of districts should be expected to have higher overall rates of turnout, as 
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party mobilization will be greater. Studies have for the most part confirmed this hypothesis 
(Blais and Carty 1990; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Franklin 1996; Radcliff and 
Davis 2000).  
In addition, PR should have a positive effect on turnout due to the disproportion in the 
translation of votes into seats in majority-type electoral systems. It has been argued that high 
disproportional systems will punish minor parties, so supporters of these parties would have less 
incentives to turnout (Jackman and Miller, 1995). Furthermore, an unequal translation of votes 
into seats could diminish voters’ sense of political efficacy, increasing their belief that their vote 
is of no importance, and leading them to abstain from voting (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1996). 
On the other hand, PR should have a negative effect on voter turnout due to the higher 
number of parties that it fosters in comparison to majority systems. Almost all of the empirical 
research has found a negative correlation between the number of parties and turnout (Jackman, 
1987; Blais and Carty, 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Radcliff and Davis, 2000), except for 
Latin America, where there seems to be no relationship between both variables (Pérez-Liñán, 
2001; Fornos et al., 2004).  
It has been claimed that multipartism should be inversely related to turnout since the 
composition of the government after the elections will likely be made out of a coalition of 
parties. As the government is not identified before the election (Shugart and Carey, 1992; 
Shugart, 2001; Powell, 2000), voters are less likely to feel efficacious because they perceive that 
they are not directly selecting their government, and thus have fewer incentives to vote. As a 
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result, multiparty systems are thought to obscure the link between voters’ actions and the 
outcome of the election. This argument is, however, largely focused on parliamentary systems’ 
experience with coalition governments; majoritarian presidential systems could provide higher 
pre-election identifiability (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Powell, 2000). In addition, a higher 
number of parties could also lead to greater choices presented to voters and, hence, more options 
for them to choose from on election day.  
Concurrent elections in presidential systems have been linked to increasing voter turnout 
(Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). This is due to two main reasons: they reduce the costs of 
voting because citizens can go to the polls one time rather than having to make two trips to the 
ballot box, and they clarify the policy implications of the vote. The former refers to the reduction 
in the physical costs of voting. The latter has to do with the fact that concurrent presidential and 
legislative elections increase the likelihood of majority government, where the winning party 
will be supposedly better able to implement its policy agenda through Congress. Thus, voters 
should be able to distinguish more clearly the policy consequences of their vote for President, 
increasing the perceived benefits of voting.  
Specifically for Latin America, there are mixed findings of the effect of institutional 
variables on voter turnout. Pérez-Liñán (2001) finds that neither multipartism, unicameralism, 
electoral disproportionality, the type of electoral district (whether it is competitive or not), nor 
compulsory voting are significant predictors of voter turnout. On the contrary, Fornos et al. 
(2004) findings suggest that turnout is determined primarily by unicameralism, compulsory 
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voting, and concurrent legislative and executive elections, which have significant positive 
effects. Kostadinova and Power (2007) also find an effect of institutional variables on voter 
turnout in the region: unicameralism, disproportionality, district magnitude, and concurrent 
elections are all significant predictors of participation in elections.   
 
Socio-demographic explanations 
Cross-national as well as nation-specific studies relying on survey data have concluded that 
the “resource model” of political participation is a strong predictor of citizen’s political 
involvement. The model developed by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) argues that 
participation is driven by time, money and civic skills, and that these resources are distributed 
unequally across socio-economic groups. Those citizens with higher socio-economic status 
(SES) are more likely to acquire and have a wider range of resources that allow them to better 
bare the costs of voting and are, thus, more likely to show up at the polling booth (Almond and 
Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). These 
individuals tend to have larger amounts of time to participate in politics and are better informed 
than less educated and poorer citizens. Therefore, individuals with higher income and higher-
status jobs are more likely to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Rosenstone 1982). 
Education is also closely associated with participation (Blais 2000; Burden 2009; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980) as a core predictor of socio-economic status and civic skills.  
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Research on conventional political participation in the developed world has also found that 
age is associated with turnout (Lane, 1959; Strate et al., 1989; Jankowski and Strate, 1995): as 
citizens transition into adulthood, they become more involved with public affairs, more 
connected with their communities and develop a greater sense of civic duty, which increases 
their incentives to participate. In addition, as older citizens become inserted in social networks, 
their behavior is monitored and scrutinized by others, increasing the costs of not voting. Gender 
has also been linked to voter turnout: it has been argued that men have more resources and, thus, 
are more likely to turnout than women. However, recent comparative research suggests that the 
gender gap has gradually disappeared and that it is usually women who turnout at higher rates 
than men (Desposato and Norrander, 2009; Lehouq and Wall, 2004).  
In addition, comparative and within country studies have found that party identification 
increases the probability of voting (Campbell et al., 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Blais, 2000; Green et al., 2002): identifying with a political 
party reduces the costs of voting, because it serves as a decision short-cut when voters are trying 
to choose between different electoral options (Campbell et al., 1960; Downs, 1957). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that citizens who identify with a political party obtain a higher 
expressive benefit when voting, so they have a higher motivation to do so (Achen and Sinnott, 
2007).  
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A -not so new- explanation 
      Even though the conventional wisdom holds that institutions outperform other variables in 
explaining variations in voter turnout, a growing comparative literature has been focusing on the 
psychological determinants of why people vote. These studies look at citizens’ political attitudes 
such as trust in institutions, and have its roots in the works of Almond and Verba (1963), 
Inglehart (1997) and Putnam (1993). These authors argued about the effect of attitudinal 
variables such as trust and efficacy in explaining citizens’ political engagement. Studies on the 
American electorate had also explored the relation between cultural attitudes and turnout as early 
as in the 1970’s. The claim of these early studies by Citrin (1974) and Miller (1980) was that 
there was no direct causal link between attitudes of trust in government and the decision to vote 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Hetherington (1999) found that trust in the political system had 
an impact in participation for the period 1968-1996, but its effect was on voter choice rather than 
on turnout. His findings suggest that high trust was associated with voting for the incumbent 
government when there were only two candidates running, while it had no effect when three 
candidates were competing. Declining trust helped to explain the large degree of third-party 
success, since those citizens with low trust in government were more willing to vote for 
candidates that promised change.  
Other studies have suggested that distrust, instead of trust, encourages participation among 
those who are politically interested (Luks, 1998), those who are dissatisfied with the policies of 
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the current administration (Craig and Maggiotto, 1981), those who are highly educated (Citrin, 
1977) and those who trust opposition leaders (Nilson and Nilson, 1980). 
More recently, a growing comparative literature has been focusing on the psychological 
reasons of why people vote, examining citizens’ political attitudes such as trust in elections, in 
Parliament, and satisfaction with democracy. As regards trust in elections, Birch (2010) analyzes 
the relationship between perceptions of electoral fairness and turnout in 31 countries between 
1996 and 2002 using survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project. Her 
findings provide evidence in favor of a positive relation between confidence in the electoral 
process and voting. Norris (2012) also explores the relationship between citizens’ trust in 
electoral institutions and participation in elections. Using data from the 6th wave of the World 
Values Survey for the period 2010-2012, the author finds evidence about the positive impact that 
citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity have on turnout: “those with more faith in the process 
proved more willing to cast a ballot” (Norris, 2012: 13).  
Trust in Parliament has also been found to have a positive effect on turnout. Cox (2003) 
studies the association between political trust and voter turnout among member states of the 
European Union and finds that turnout in the 1999 European Parliament election was strongly 
correlated with confidence in political institutions, in particular with trust in the European 
Parliament. Grönlund and Setala (2007) study how citizens’ evaluations of the political system 
and its actors affect their propensity to vote using data from the first round of the European 
Social Survey (ESS), collected simultaneously in 22 countries during 2002-2003. They find that 
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citizens who trust parliament turn out more than citizens who are distrustful of this institution, 
and that satisfaction with the way democracy works also increases the probability of voting.        
When citizens distrust parliament and are dissatisfied with the democratic system, voting is no 
longer considered a meaningful way to influence political outcomes. Hadjar and Beck (2010) 
have similar findings. These authors analyze the determinants of non-voting in 24 European 
countries using data from the 2006 European Social Survey. They find that citizens with lower 
trust in parliament and with a lower satisfaction with politics have a higher likelihood of not 
voting. 
On the other hand, Belanger and Nadeau (2005) study the effect of political trust on 
individual vote choice in Canada using data from the Canadian Election studies and, in line with 
Hetherington (1999), find that this variable has a significant effect: the incumbent party benefits 
from political trust, while third parties mostly benefit from distrust. Booth and Seligson (2005) 
focus, instead, on the effect of political legitimacy on different forms of conventional and non-
conventional participation in Costa Rica using a 2002 national survey. The authors find a 
positive and significant relationship between support for regime institutions and the most 
conventional form of participation: voting.  
However, few studies have analyzed the impact of citizens’ attitudes towards political 
institutions on turnout in Latin America. The first article to address this issue was McCann and 
Dominguez (1998) who studied the effect that perceptions of electoral fraud and corruption 
among Mexican citizens had on electoral participation and electoral outcomes, using national 
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public opinion surveys conducted between 1986 and 1995. Their findings provide evidence 
regarding the negative impact of citizens’ perceptions of electoral fraud on their likelihood of 
turnout: the greater the expectation of fraud, the lower the likelihood of voting. Only those who 
believed that the electoral process was not fraudulent and that their vote would make a difference 
for the electoral result were more likely to turnout.  
More recently, an article by Cantu and Garcia-Ponce (2015) also focuses on the perceptions 
of electoral fairness among the Mexican electorate. However, this article does not seek to explain 
the impact of citizens’ attitudes towards the electoral process on turnout but rather the variables 
that help to understand how these perceptions come about. Using three nation-wide pre- and 
post- electoral surveys for the presidential election of 2012, they find evidence of partisan effects 
on attitudes towards the electoral process. Supporters of the incumbent party have lower levels of 
confidence on the integrity of the electoral process once they learn that their preferred candidate 
lost, whereas the discredit about this process among supporters of a party that has never won the 
elections remains consistent over time.   
Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) explore the impact of trust in elections on voter turnout going a 
step further and doing a cross-national comparison between Latin American countries. Using 
data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project for the year 2010 the authors find a 
positive and significant effect of this variable on turnout, especially in countries without 
compulsory voting laws. In countries where voting is mandatory, the effect of perceptions of 
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electoral fairness on turnout is weaker as citizens have incentives to vote in order to avoid 
sanctions.  
While all the aforementioned studies established a positive relation between citizen’s 
affection towards political institutions and participation, research has also found that voters turn 
to the polls in order to express their dissatisfaction with these institutions. Power and Garand 
(2007) study the determinants of invalid voting in Latin America from 1980 to 2000 and find that  
political discontent increased the likelihood that citizens spoiled their ballots. In addition, a 
recent study by Ezrow and Xezonakis (2014) looks at the over-time relationship between 
satisfaction with democracy and voter turnout within 12 European countries over the period 
1976-2011. They find that voter turnout actually increases with lower levels of satisfaction.  
In sum, while comparative aggregate-level research has established the predominance of 
institutional variables for explaining variations in voter turnout, there is a growing literature on 
electoral participation in the advanced industrial democracies that has been focusing on the effect 
that individual-level attitudes and perceptions towards the political system have on turnout. 
However, this type of research in Latin America still remains scarce.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and hypotheses  
 In order to study the impact of citizens’ attitudes towards democratic institutions on voter 
turnout I use data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)1 for 18 countries 
for the period 2004-2014. Table 1 presents the countries, the years for which survey data is 
available for each one of them, and the total number of respondents for each country included in 
the study.  
The surveys administered by LAPOP focus on issues dealing with democratic values and 
behaviors. One of the main advantages of using these surveys is their broad comparability: the 
same questions are asked to respondents in different countries, facilitating a comparative 
analysis. Another advantage is that their sampling process maximizes the representativeness of 
the sample of respondents in each country.2 
 The unit of analysis is the individual respondents of each country for each wave of the 
survey. This means that I will estimate regressions for each of the 18 countries included in the 
sample, and within each country for each year in which a survey was administered. In this way, 
I will be able to have a better understanding of the longitudinal relationship between the main 
                                                1	 The dataset for the surveys of every country can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/free-
access.php	
2 The sample for the surveys is obtained through multistage stratification by country and then sub-
stratification within each country by major geographic region. Within each primary sampling unit, the 
respondents are selected randomly. The selection of respondents also applies quotas for sex and age at the 
household level. More technical information about each survey can be obtained in the website of the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php.  
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independent and dependent variables within each country, and about the presence of any 
regional patterns in this relationship. In addition, within each country there will be a high 
control for the various economic, cultural and institutional variables that could affect turnout. 
 
Table 1. Countries and years included in the study 
 
Country 
 
Survey  Years 
 
N 
  
Country 
 
Survey Years 
 
N 
ARGENTINA 2008 - 2010 - 2012 - 2014 
 
3,965 
 
 ECUADOR 2004-2006-2008-
2010-2012-2014 
13,240 
 
BOLIVIA 2004-2006-2008-2010-
2012-2014 
14,568  EL 
SALVADOR 
2004-2006-2008-
2010-2012-2014 
7,686 
BRAZIL 2007-2008-2010-2012-
2014 
8,247  GUATEMALA 2004-2006-2008-
2010-2012-2014 
6,967 
COLOMBIA 2004-2005-2006-2007-
2008-2009-2010-2011-
2012-2014 
12,506  HONDURAS 2004-2006-2008-
2010-2012-2014 
8,072 
COSTA 
RICA 
2004-2006-2008-2010-
2012-2014 
6,658  NICARAGUA 2004-2006-2008-
2010-2012-2014 
7,803 
VENEZUELA 2007-2008-2010-2012-
2014 
4,962  PANAMA 2004-2006-2008-
2010-2012-2014 
7,965 
CHILE 2006-2008-2010-2012-
2014 
5,526  PERU 2006-2008-2010-
2012-2014 
5,919 
URUGUAY 2007-2008-2010-2012-
2014 
6,031  GUYANA 2006-2009-2010-
2012-2014 
6,792 
MEXICO 2004-2006-2008-2010-
2012-2014 
7,728  PARAGUAY 2006-2008-2010-
2012-2014 
5,193 
Total  70,191  Total  69,637 
 
The dependent variable in the analysis is self-reported voter turnout in presidential elections. 
This variable is measured in the surveys through the following question: “Did you vote in the 
last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)?”. Turnout is a dichotomous 
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variable measuring if respondents voted in the last presidential elections: 1= yes, voted; 0= no, 
did not vote. 
One of the limitations with using survey data to measure turnout is that most of the times the 
proportion of respondents who report voting is greater than those who actually voted. It has been 
argued that this is due to the fact that non-voters are motivated to give a socially desirable 
response. Voter validation studies in the United States that match a respondents reported turnout 
against the official election records have confirmed the existence of this bias towards over-
reporting, especially due to a great number of non-voters who claim to have voted (Clausen, 
1968; Karp and Brockington, 2005; Selb and Munzert, 2013; Silver et al. 1986). While I am 
aware of this limitation in the data, I was unable to match respondents’ reported turnout against 
the official elections records with the information I have, so I will proceed with the use of self-
reported turnout as my dependent variable.  
The main independent variables in the analysis are trust in elections, respect for 
institutions, and satisfaction with democracy.3 The first variable was constructed on the basis 
of the following question: “To what extent do you trust elections in this country?” The second 
variable was constructed on the basis of the following question: “To what extent do you respect 
                                                
3 I conducted bivariate correlations between all of the variables for each country and each survey year and 
none of the coefficients was higher than 0.5. Thus, because they are not highly correlated it is valid to use 
all of them as independent variables of the study. I also considered including more variables in the study 
such as trust in Congress, trust in the President, and trust in political parties but these were highly 
correlated (coefficients higher than 0.5) with trust in elections.  
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the political institutions of (country)?” All of these variables are measured with an ordinal scale 
from 1 to 7, where a code of 1 corresponds to “not at all” and a code of 7 corresponds to “a lot”.  
Finally, information for the variable satisfaction with democracy was obtained from the 
following question: “In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied 
or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?” Responses were given based 
on a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 indicates “very satisfied” and 4 “very dissatisfied”. The scale was 
recoded into 1=“very dissatisfied” and 4=“very satisfied”. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Trust in Elections 
 Note: The boxes plot the percentages of the respondents for every category of trust in elections in each country 
and for all survey years. The vertical lines inside the boxes indicate the median level of trust in elections in 
each country.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of Respect for Institutions 
Note: The boxes plot the percentages of the respondents for every category of respect for institutions in 
each country and for all survey years. The vertical lines inside the boxes represent the median level of 
respect for institutions in each country.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
 
Figures 1 to 3 present the distributions of the independent variables for the 18 countries in the 
analysis. The boxplots and histogram represent reported trust and satisfaction levels for all the 
years in which the survey was administered in each of the countries. The boxes in the boxplots 
indicate the positions of the upper and lower quartiles of the respondents in each country, and 
their interior consists of 50% of the distribution. The vertical line inside the boxes represents the 
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(whiskers) outside the boxes represent the maximum and minimum values of both variables 
reported by respondents in each country. In the period covered by the data respondents in El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile exhibit consistently high levels of trust in elections and 
respect for institutions. Paraguay is, on average, the country with the lowest level of trust in 
elections. As regards satisfaction with democracy, the variable is distributed similarly across 
countries; there is no country with overall high levels of satisfaction with democracy (4th 
category), and most of the respondents fall between the 2nd and 3rd category in every country.   
My expectation is that higher levels of trust in elections, respect for institutions and 
satisfaction with democracy will lead to an increase in voter turnout through citizens’ sense of 
political efficacy. This is due to the fact that affection towards political institutions should 
increase citizens’ sense of political efficacy. Political efficacy refers to “the feeling that 
individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e. that it 
is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties” (Campbell et al. 1954: 187). In other words, it refers 
to citizens’ beliefs that their action – in this case, voting - can influence the outcome of political 
decisions – in this case, the result of the election and the direction of policies that will be enacted 
as a result (Craig and Maggiotto 1982). When citizens have high levels of trust in the electoral 
process and respect for institutions of the political system, they will therefore feel more 
politically efficacious and believe that institutions are responsive to their actions.   
If we assume that citizens derive a benefit from “affirming their efficacy in the political 
system” (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968: 28), the benefit they derive from voting will outweigh 
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their perceived costs (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). As a result, they will have more incentives to 
turnout (Almond and Verba, 1963; Craig and Maggiotto, 1982; Finkel, 1985; Riker and 
Ordeshook, 1968). An increased sense of political efficacy will help citizens overcome the 
constant suspicion that their participation is hopeless, as they will instead believe that their vote 
makes a difference in the outcome of the election. In turn, if citizens perceive that elections are 
not a trustworthy instrument through which they can impact the election results, the costs that 
they perceive from showing up to the polls might outweigh their perceived benefits, preferring to 
stay at home on election day. Because citizens feel less politically efficacious, their electoral 
participation will likely decrease (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Shaffer, 1981). As Birch (2010) 
claims: “If voters fear that polls are corrupt, they have less incentive to bother casting a vote; 
participating in a process in which they do not have confidence will be less attractive, and they 
may well perceive the outcome of the election to be a foregone conclusion” (Birch, 2010: 1603).  
 In sum, I have three main testable hypotheses concerning the effects of the various forms of 
affection towards political institutions on turnout. All else being equal, I expect that: 
H1: “Citizens who have higher levels of trust in elections will be more likely to vote” 
H2: “Citizens who have higher levels of respect for institutions will be more likely to vote”  
H3: “Citizens who have higher levels of satisfaction with democracy will be more likely to 
vote” 
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I also include a series of control variables4 that have been shown in previous research to have 
an effect on electoral participation. First, it is possible that the age of the respondents has an 
impact on their likelihood of turnout (Lane, 1959; Strate et al., 1989; Jankowski and Strate, 
1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Age is a variable that measures the age of the 
respondents in each survey, dividing it into five cohorts. I expect that, other things equal, older 
people who have a greater sense of civic duty and are more aware of public affairs will turnout 
more than younger people.  
Second, I include a dummy variable that measures the gender of the respondent (1=male). 
My expectation regarding this variable is that in Latin America, women will turnout more than 
men. Even though it has been argued that men have more resources than women and thus have 
higher rates of electoral participation, recent research in the region suggests that the gender gap 
has been gradually disappearing and that women have higher turnout rates than men (Carreras 
and Castañeda Angarita, 2013; Lehouq and Wall, 2004; Seligson, 2002).  
Additionally, I incorporate a series of control variables corresponding to the resource model 
of participation: employment status, income and education. Employment status is a dummy 
variable that measures if respondents were employed or unemployed at the time of the survey 
(1=employed). Income is a categorical variable that measures the decile into which the 
respondents’ household monthly income fits. Education is also a categorical variable that 
measures whether the respondents had no education (0), primary school (1), secondary school 
                                                
4 More information about the operationalization of these variables can be found in the Appendix.  
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education (2), or achieved a higher education (3). Following the expectations of the resource 
model of political participation, I hypothesize that citizens with jobs, a higher income and a 
higher level of education are more likely to turnout (Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980) since they have more resources to bare the costs of voting than citizens with a 
lower socio-economic status.  
Finally, I include a variable that measures whether respondents identify with a political 
party (1=yes). My expectations are in line with previous research: citizens who have a party 
identification will be more likely to vote, other things being equal, than those who do not. This 
could be due to the expressive benefits that they receive from voting for their favorite party 
(Green et al., 2004), to the decrease in the costs of voting as a result of the cues that party labels 
provide to citizens (Downs, 1957), or to the fact that people who strongly prefer certain political 
outcomes are more likely to participate in politics (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2002). 
 
Modeling turnout in Latin America 
 In this article, I use data from LAPOP to explore the determinants of voter turnout in 18 
Latin American countries from 2004 to 2014, and to test my three main hypotheses. I suggest 
that voter turnout is a function of a series of attitudinal variables, socio-economic variables, and 
individual resources. In order to test my hypotheses, I estimate logistic regression models for 
each country and each year in which the survey was administered to have a better understanding 
of the longitudinal effect of the three main independent variables on turnout. The use of logistic 
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regressions is appropriate since the dependent variable of interest – voter turnout – is 
dichotomous.  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 In the tables below, I provide estimates of the coefficients from the logit models together 
with the corresponding standard errors. Since these models are nonlinear, the estimates only 
provide information about the direction and the statistical significance of the relationships 
between each independent variable and the dependent variable of interest. The size of the 
substantive impact of any one variable (but not its direction) is a function of the value at which 
the effect is evaluated as well as the values of all the other variables in the model. Thus, I also 
report some interpretation of substantive effects in order to understand better the impact of the 
main independent variables. 
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Table 2.1. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Argentina 
 
        
2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust+in+Elections !0.041 !0.038 0.052 !0.009
(0.056) (0.045) (0.095) (0.052)
Satisfaction+with 0.321* 0.042 !0.078 !0.149
Democracy (0.138) (0.108) (0.239) (0.152)
Respect+for+Institutions 0.024 !0.007 !0.087 !0.088
(0.051) (0.044) (0.095) (0.052)
Party+Identification 0.665** 0.505* 0.608 0.961***
(0.214) (0.220) (0.386) (0.249)
Education 0.462*** 0.355** !0.363 0.313
(0.138) (0.124) (0.281) (0.170)
Income !0.018 0.081 0.195** 0.018
(0.035) (0.044) (0.066) (0.022)
Age 0.128 0.424*** 0.059 0.518***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.127) (0.079)
Gender 0.032 !0.514** !0.688* !0.264
(0.180) (0.158) (0.331) (0.202)
Employment+Status 1.102*** 0.469** 0.832* 0.933***
(0.183) (0.167) (0.343) (0.207)
_cons !1.396** !0.902* 1.794 !0.555
(0.506) (0.419) (1.050) (0.610)
N 952 995 486 864
Standard6errors6in6parentheses
*6p<0.05 6**6p<0.01 6***6p<0.001
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Table 2.2. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Guyana 
 
2006 2009 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.034 0.075* 0.215*** 0.111 0.02
(+0.047) (+0.033) (+0.046) (+0.073) (+0.042)
Satisfaction,with 0.208 +0.0726 +0.158 0.181 0.069
Democracy (+0.136) (+0.083) (+0.107) (+0.168) (+0.113)
Respect,for,Institutions 0.064 0.031 +0.029 0.017 +0.0000213
(+0.056) (+0.035) (+0.049) (+0.075) (+0.044)
Party,Identification 1.647*** 1.129*** 1.289*** 0.996** 0.838**
(+0.327) (+0.228) (+0.209) (+0.32) (+0.261)
Gender +0.107 +0.598*** +0.568*** 0.045 +0.378*
(+0.178) (+0.12) (+0.163) (+0.233) (+0.169)
Age 0.284** 0.824*** 0.719*** 0.309** 0.776***
(+0.094) (+0.057) (+0.0744) (+0.102) (+0.075)
Income +0.012 0.012 +0.082 0.028 +0.003
(+0.048) (+0.030) (+0.043) (+0.029) (+0.018)
Education 0.201 0.0813 0.0359 0.490* 0.278
(+0.151) (+0.097) (+0.141) (+0.212) (+0.152)
Employment,Status 0.401 0.577*** 0.687*** +0.057 0.549**
(+0.231) (+0.123) (+0.172) (+0.243) (+0.171)
_cons +1.127* +1.539*** +1.346** +1.634* +1.772***
(+0.561) (+0.362) (+0.499) (+0.763) (+0.525)
N 875 2058 1058 559 1121
Standard6errors6in6parentheses
*6p<0.05 6**6p<0.01 6***6p<0.001
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       Table 2.3. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Venezuela 
 
 
2007 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.140** 0.060 0.069 0.254* 0.166*
(0.054) (0.059) (0.039) (0.116) (0.0671)
Satisfaction,with .0.104 0.225 0.066 .0.099 .0.053
Democracy (0.130) (0.129) (0.099) (0.251) (0.178)
Respect,for,institutions .0.047 0.044 0.026 .0.006 .0.101
(0.053) (0.057) (0.037) (0.113) (0.062)
Party,Identification 1.176*** 1.166*** 0.832*** 0.852* 1.493***
(0.248) (0.248) (0.160) (0.355) (0.290)
Gender .0.228 .0.427* .0.194 0.131 0.088
(0.198) (0.217) (0.140) (0.418) (0.241)
Age 0.570*** 0.590*** 0.672*** 1.745*** 0.390***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.0673) (0.235) (0.115)
Income .0.030 .0.013 0.124** .0.070 0.0297
(0.040) (0.064) (0.040) (0.054) (0.029)
Education 0.516*** 0.613*** 0.292** 0.955** 0.606***
(0.151) (0.175) (0.112) (0.327) (0.175)
Employment,Status 0.554* 0.545* 0.476*** 0.930* 0.149
(0.239) (0.215) (0.143) (0.413) (0.253)
_cons .1.562* .2.507*** .3.065*** .5.947*** .0.929
(0.637) (0.657) (0.431) (1.269) (0.701)
N 753 852 1236 424 1093
Standard6errors6in6parentheses
*6p<0.05 6**6p<0.01 6***6p<0.001
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Table 2.4. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Uruguay 
 
 
 
2007 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.009 $0.044 0.115 0.179 0.096
(0.094) (0.067) (0.082) (0.102) (0.066)
Satisfaction 0.601* 0.186 0.230 $0.018 0.614***
with,Democracy (0.262) (0.174) (0.220) (0.285) (0.172)
Respect,for,Institutions 0.0597 $0.003 $0.077 $0.016 $0.066
(0.092) (0.060) (0.078) (0.091) (0.059)
Party,Identification $0.421 $0.0861 0.241 0.390 $0.063
(0.329) (0.223) (0.250) (0.320) (0.209)
Gender $0.406 $0.440 $0.691** $0.467 $1.047***
(0.349) (0.229) (0.256) (0.325) (0.231)
Age 1.101*** 1.468*** 0.727*** 1.155*** 1.521***
(0.174) (0.121) (0.105) (0.157) (0.108)
Income 0.191* $0.016 0.047 0.005 $0.023
(0.081) (0.042) (0.051) (0.044) (0.024)
Education 0.531 0.460* 0.381 0.390 0.002
(0.285) (0.191) (0.205) (0.250) (0.173)
Employment,Status 0.334 1.031*** 0.769** 0.554 1.419***
(0.417) (0.228) (0.255) (0.327) (0.241)
_cons $3.768*** $2.862*** $1.215 $2.566* $4.087***
(1.013) (0.663) (0.803) (1.017) (0.666)
N 635 1290 1321 635 1319
Standard6errors6in6parentheses
*6p<0.05 6**6p<0.01 6***6p<0.001
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Table 2.5. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Peru 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections !0.049 0.021 0.013 0.045 !0.014
(0.089) (0.066) (0.060) (0.104) (0.061)
Satisfaction !0.211 0.001 !0.120 0.239 !0.075
with,Democracy (0.229) (0.170) (0.144) (0.229) (0.160)
Respect,for,Institutions 0.010 0.029 !0.013 !0.006 !0.081
(0.086) (0.063) (0.054) (0.097) (0.063)
Party,Identification 0.051 0.376 0.121 0.008 0.458
(0.315) (0.293) (0.224) (0.417) (0.269)
Gender !0.024 !0.340 !0.366 !0.304 !0.533*
(0.303) (0.217) (0.191) (0.317) (0.221)
Age 0.505*** 1.268*** 1.285*** 0.848*** 1.118***
(0.145) (0.123) (0.098) (0.156) (0.106)
Income !0.019 !0.131** !0.0176 !0.008 0.017
(0.075) (0.050) (0.048) (0.045) (0.023)
Education 0.842*** 0.774*** 0.924*** 0.321 0.484**
(0.241) (0.175) (0.151) (0.247) (0.167)
Employment,Status 1.214*** 0.811*** 1.001*** 0.229 0.574**
(0.318) (0.217) (0.191) (0.329) (0.220)
_cons !0.602 !2.126*** !3.445*** !1.177 !1.663**
(0.943) (0.645) (0.583) (0.959) (0.626)
N 838 1298 1262 606 1029
Standard6errors6in6parentheses
NA6=6Question6not6Asked
*6p<0.05 6**6p<0.01 6***6p<0.001
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Table 2.6. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Paraguay 
 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.091 0.003 0.068 (0.066 0.021
(0.052) (0.060) (0.044) (0.059) (0.040)
Satisfaction 0.080 (0.025 0.067 0.110 (0.177
with,Democracy (0.120) (0.134) (0.126) (0.160) (0.116)
Respect,for,Institutions 0.045 (0.083 0.053 0.036 0.064
(0.046) (0.049) (0.044) (0.056) (0.039)
Party,Identification 0.330 0.0121 0.276 (0.169 (0.340
(0.174) (0.217) (0.166) (0.229) (0.174)
Gender 1.329*** 1.084*** 0.910*** 1.300*** 0.718***
(0.112) (0.110) (0.0842) (0.128) (0.083)
Age 0.0995* 0.0537 (0.00961 (0.018 0.018
(0.046) (0.049) (0.030) (0.027) (0.017)
Income 0.339* 0.487** 0.448*** 0.818*** 0.639***
(0.140) (0.151) (0.121) (0.158) (0.118)
Education NA 1.032*** 0.843*** 0.841*** 0.563***
(0.186) (0.164) (0.205) (0.162)
Employment,Status NA 0.707** 0.503** 0.455 0.375*
(0.223) (0.170) (0.242) (0.179)
_cons (4.230*** (3.502*** (3.617*** (4.670*** (2.161***
(0.525) (0.539) (0.514) (0.700) (0.466)
N 819 819 1003 617 1057
Standard8errors8in8parentheses
NA8=8Question8not8Asked
*8p<0.05 8**8p<0.01 8***8p<0.001
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Table 2.7. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Panama 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.076* &0.068 0.117* 0.0816 0.169* 0.091
(0.036) (0.064) (0.047) (0.0530) (0.070) (0.049)
Satisfaction,with &0.038 &0.345* &0.108 &0.005 &0.094 0.054
Democracy (0.098) (0.146) (0.0903) (0.132) (0.173) (0.118)
Respect,for &0.024 &0.012 &0.021 0.016 &0.161** &0.086
Institutions (0.036) (0.064) (0.044) (0.053) (0.061) (0.051)
Gender &0.0181 &0.339 &0.541*** &0.332* &0.444* &0.241
(0.141) (0.234) (0.153) (0.162) (0.219) (0.162)
Age 1.265*** 0.588*** 0.831*** 0.732*** 0.656*** 1.306***
(0.080) (0.112) (0.071) (0.0819) (0.091) (0.086)
Income &0.000415 &0.024 0.017 &0.056 0.067 0.017
(0.0432) (0.083) (0.047) (0.049) (0.037) (0.018)
Education 0.498*** 0.355* 0.333** 0.307* &0.167 &0.007
(0.118) (0.160) (0.124) (0.137) (0.180) (0.141)
Party,Identification NA 1.116*** 1.388*** 1.514*** 2.215*** 1.499***
(0.326) (0.180) (0.234) (0.313) (0.170)
Employment,Status NA 0.784*** 1.084*** 0.626*** 0.705** 0.862***
(0.216) (0.161) (0.163) (0.228) (0.171)
_cons &3.018*** 0.334 &2.416*** &1.494* &1.198 &3.435***
(0.459) (0.619) (0.455) (0.583) (0.673) (0.507)
N 1527 809 1356 1381 661 1356
Standard8errors8in8parentheses
NA8=8Question8not8Asked
*8p<0.05 8**8p<0.01 8***8p<0.001
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Table 2.8. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Nicaragua 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.023 %0.014 %0.010 0.078* 0.104** 0.118***
(0.039) (0.044) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Satisfaction,with 0.003 %0.173 %0.077 %0.090 0.179 0.013
Democracy (0.110) (0.123) (0.096) (0.098) (0.118) (0.110)
Respect,for 0.017 0.027 %0.051 %0.044 %0.009 %0.024
Institutions (0.039) (0.046) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)
Gender %0.0203 %0.0635 %0.193 %0.311* %0.102 %0.136
(0.157) (0.197) (0.144) (0.147) (0.163) (0.144)
Age 0.825*** 0.408*** 0.444*** 0.801*** 0.478*** 0.560***
(0.087) (0.081) (0.067) (0.073) (0.067) (0.060)
Income %0.005 0.061 0.003 0.071 %0.011 0.005
(0.035) (0.049) (0.039) (0.040) (0.022) (0.014)
Education 0.266* 0.139 0.377*** 0.185 0.583*** 0.277**
(0.108) (0.123) (0.096) (0.099) (0.100) (0.089)
Party,Identification NA 1.032*** 1.115*** 0.750*** 1.359*** 0.755***
(0.173) (0.154) (0.141) (0.157) (0.137)
Employment,Status NA 0.581** 0.554*** 0.447** 0.381* 0.151
(0.217) (0.145) (0.147) (0.165) (0.146)
_cons %1.075* %1.087* %0.678 %1.577*** %2.078*** %1.789***
(0.436) (0.506) (0.399) (0.388) (0.454) (0.422)
N 1046 778 1303 1326 1502 1365
Standard8errors8in8parentheses
NA8=8Question8not8Asked
*8p<0.05 8**8p<0.01 8***8p<0.001
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Table 2.9. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Honduras 
 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections !0.023 !0.004 !0.050 0.171*** 0.033 0.107**
(0.0363) (0.0498) (0.0615) (0.0475) (0.0593) (0.0361)
Satisfaction,with 0.0964 0.192 !0.036 0.0974 !0.246* 0.088
Democracy (0.0944) (0.122) (0.140) (0.0895) (0.116) (0.098)
Respect,for 0.061 0.0149 0.084 0.016 0.061 !0.068
Institutions (0.037) (0.0470) (0.053) (0.0470) (0.054) (0.035)
Gender 0.251 0.0298 !0.715*** 0.202 !0.544** !0.0922
(0.139) (0.163) (0.206) (0.141) (0.211) (0.145)
Age 0.764*** 0.323*** 0.860*** 0.258*** 0.403*** 0.332***
(0.070) (0.085) (0.086) (0.059) (0.075) (0.062)
Income !0.055 0.105* 0.030 !0.064 !0.006 !0.020
(0.037) (0.049) (0.051) (0.038) (0.026) (0.0159)
Education 0.350** 0.151 !0.0690 0.239* 0.0624 0.247*
(0.123) (0.140) (0.148) (0.104) (0.113) (0.104)
Party,Identification NA 0.923*** 2.267*** 1.287*** 1.354*** 0.806***
(0.176) (0.177) (0.131) (0.184) (0.141)
Employment,Status NA NA 1.205*** 0.434** 0.534** 0.101
(0.207) (0.142) (0.196) (0.145)
_cons !1.796*** !0.743 !2.524*** !2.131*** !1.260* !0.561
(0.401) (0.501) (0.496) (0.411) (0.506) (0.374)
N 1229 1206 1103 1360 626 1381
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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Table 2.10. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Guatemala 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.069 0.059 &0.031 0.009 0.151 0.047
(0.037) (0.051) (0.0454) (0.045) (0.082) (0.039)
Satisfaction,with 0.029 &0.057 &0.143 0.0417 &0.184 &0.042
Democracy (0.103) (0.131) (0.130) (0.110) (0.179) (0.120)
Respect,for 0.006 &0.036 0.094* 0.00972 0.235** &0.111*
Institutions (0.040) (0.054) (0.044) (0.0443) (0.072) (0.044)
Gender 0.359* 0.247 0.117 0.325* 0.0139 0.0524
(0.141) (0.175) (0.177) (0.152) (0.246) (0.153)
Age 0.357*** 0.642*** 0.360*** 0.820*** 0.302** 0.815***
(0.068) (0.088) (0.075) (0.075) (0.111) (0.074)
Income 0.004 0.059 &0.029 &0.005 0.095** 0.034
(0.029) (0.053) (0.044) (0.039) (0.036) (0.018)
Education 0.404*** 0.335* 0.526*** 0.449*** 0.054 &0.099
(0.115) (0.137) (0.131) (0.120) (0.183) (0.096)
Party,Identification NA 0.749** 0.948*** 0.479* 1.055* 0.299
(0.239) (0.256) (0.198) (0.432) (0.239)
Employment,Status NA 0.942*** 1.054*** 0.812*** 1.049*** 0.584***
(0.258) (0.178) (0.162) (0.238) (0.157)
_cons &1.176** &2.549*** &1.070* &2.762*** &1.825* &1.108*
(0.413) (0.521) (0.482) (0.476) (0.739) (0.446)
N 1018 750 1035 1143 569 1251
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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   Table 2.11. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in El Salvador 
 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.0525 0.114* 0.069 0.096* *0.016 0.104**
(0.036) (0.046) (0.038) (0.044) (0.058) (0.038)
Satisfaction,with 0.0122 *0.055 *0.039 *0.009 0.169 *0.002
Democracy (0.101) (0.121) (0.096) (0.109) (0.157) (0.104)
Respect,for 0.040 0.023 0.028 *0.004 *0.077 *0.057
Institutions (0.036) (0.046) (0.037) (0.044) (0.060) (0.039)
Gender *0.129 *0.066 *0.525*** *0.234 *0.025 *0.083
(0.137) (0.174) (0.144) (0.145) (0.222) (0.147)
Age 0.436*** 0.517*** 0.881*** 0.518*** 0.759*** 0.351***
(0.066) (0.082) (0.066) (0.067) (0.098) (0.061)
Income 0.041 0.023 0.038 *0.017 *0.026 0.026
(0.039) (0.042) (0.035) (0.038) (0.034) (0.017)
Education 0.468*** 0.221 0.281** 0.491*** 0.063 0.176
(0.106) (0.117) (0.097) (0.102) (0.159) (0.104)
Party,Identification NA 0.706*** 1.050*** 0.543*** 0.866*** 0.588***
(0.178) (0.143) (0.158) (0.238) (0.141)
Employment,Status NA 0.215 0.540*** 0.408** 0.605** 0.329*
(0.189) (0.145) (0.148) (0.221) (0.150)
_cons *1.151** *1.609** *2.662*** *1.295** *1.553* *0.877
(0.417) (0.530) (0.384) (0.461) (0.671) (0.451)
N 1301 865 1430 1430 568 1285
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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Table 2.12.  Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Ecuador 
 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections !0.015 0.051 !0.021 0.025 0.185* 0.004
(0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.050) (0.092) (0.073)
Satisfaction,with !0.255** 0.078 0.190 !0.103 0.240 0.189
Democracy (0.090) (0.094) (0.105) (0.117) (0.218) (0.174)
Respect,for !0.040 !0.044 0.012 !0.007 0.015 !0.022
Institutions (0.036) (0.033) (0.040) (0.049) (0.089) (0.075)
Gender !0.180 0.057 !0.347* !0.235 !0.420 !0.477*
(0.132) (0.127) (0.151) (0.171) (0.306) (0.236)
Age 0.776*** 1.010*** 0.237*** 0.136 0.364* 0.235*
(0.0669) (0.0708) (0.0622) (0.0706) (0.146) (0.105)
Income 0.031 !0.054 !0.002 !0.029 !0.023 0.080**
(0.046) (0.047) (0.050) (0.053) (0.046) (0.029)
Education 0.595*** 0.500*** 0.377*** 0.316* 0.392 0.167
(0.104) (0.105) (0.112) (0.123) (0.215) (0.185)
Party,Identification NA NA 0.553** 0.0782 0.812 0.934***
(0.208) (0.225) (0.496) (0.258)
Employment,Status NA NA 0.911*** 0.757*** 0.959** 0.630*
(0.153) (0.173) (0.311) (0.246)
_cons !0.214 !1.517*** 0.107 1.648** !1.016 0.192
(0.407) (0.392) (0.432) (0.526) (0.946) (0.769)
N 2508 2420 2592 2474 599 1235
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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Table 2.13. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Costa Rica 
 
 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.177*** 0.142** 0.044 0.047 0.096 0.0629
(0.037) (0.048) (0.035) (0.039) (0.058) (0.045)
Satisfaction,with 0.0332 0.322* 0.103 0.225* /0.212 /0.141
Democracy (0.105) (0.134) (0.091) (0.097) (0.163) (0.128)
Respect,for,Institutions 0.035 /0.006 0.134*** /0.042 0.036 0.036
(0.038) (0.050) (0.039) (0.043) (0.059) (0.047)
Gender /0.491*** /0.503* /0.306* /0.138 /0.543* /0.278
(0.131) (0.217) (0.141) (0.172) (0.243) (0.167)
Age 0.472*** 0.263** 0.464*** 0.954*** 0.409*** 0.207**
(0.056) (0.086) (0.059) (0.076) (0.091) (0.069)
Income 0.061* 0.051 0.021 0.079* 0.039 0.015
(0.028) (0.042) (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.019)
Education 0.133 0.405** 0.394*** 0.214 0.411* 0.366**
(0.106) (0.139) (0.104) (0.119) (0.163) (0.125)
Party,Identification NA 0.491* 0.747*** 1.375*** 1.291*** 1.763***
(0.195) (0.156) (0.153) (0.270) (0.155)
Employment,Status NA /0.0374 0.248 0.168 /0.248 0.124
(0.324) (0.141) (0.172) (0.238) (0.171)
_cons /1.537*** /1.864** /2.639*** /4.113*** /1.195 /1.319**
(0.406) (0.605) (0.432) (0.464) (0.613) (0.477)
N 1392 730 1242 1058 498 1076
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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Table 2.14. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Chile 
 
               
 
 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections NA 0.087 0.145 *0.070 0.244***
(0.052) (0.083) (0.090) (0.055)
Respect,for,Institutions 0.0593 *0.008 0.006 0.016 0.055
(0.055) (0.051) (0.079) (0.079) (0.051)
Satisfaction,with 0.323* 0.049 *0.166 0.069 0.122
Democracy (0.158) (0.131) (0.209) (0.191) (0.128)
Gender *0.308 *0.246 *0.436 *0.401 *0.153
(0.214) (0.186) (0.268) (0.255) (0.181)
Age 1.483*** 1.519*** 0.109 1.523*** 0.700***
(0.134) (0.095) (0.133) (0.143) (0.078)
Income 0.013 0.021 *0.006 0.048 *0.005
*0.057 (0.036) (0.054) (0.039) (0.021)
Education 0.0916 0.188 *0.065 0.160 0.545***
(0.209) (0.161) (0.214) (0.247) (0.157)
Employment,Status NA 0.304 0.717* 0.414 *0.130
(0.185) (0.285) (0.262) (0.182)
Party,Identification 1.056*** 0.929*** 1.046* 1.357*** 0.921**
(0.269) (0.220) (0.526) (0.410) (0.285)
_cons *4.384*** *4.583*** 1.863 *4.252*** *3.988***
(0.685) (0.574) (0.959) (0.933) (0.615)
N 696 1193 1105 622 980
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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Table 2.15. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Brazil 
 
 
 
 
2007 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.046 0.036 0.052 0.0614 0.067
(0.052) (0.047) (0.034) (0.0688) (0.049)
Satisfaction,with 0.097 0.288* 0.162 /0.294 /0.124
Democracy (0.140) (0.123) (0.096) (0.191) (0.114)
Respect,for,Institutions 0.0129 /0.016 0.024 0.0686 /0.044
(0.0523) (0.047) (0.035) (0.0685) (0.049)
Party,Identificaation 0.815*** 0.248 0.268 0.462 0.760***
(0.236) (0.207) (0.140) (0.285) (0.171)
Gender /0.563** /0.210 /0.246 /0.105 /0.354*
(0.207) (0.176) (0.132) (0.261) (0.147)
Age 0.318** 0.237** 0.738*** 0.549*** 1.794***
(0.102) (0.0724) (0.0622) (0.127) (0.088)
Income 0.313** 0.0280 /0.064 0.0334 0.0129
(0.102) (0.0529) (0.039) (0.0340) (0.020)
Education 0.468*** 0.417** 0.269* 0.176 0.511***
(0.126) (0.140) (0.113) (0.240) (0.105)
Employment,Status /0.142 0.555** 0.706*** 0.164 0.775***
(0.267) (0.181) (0.133) (0.274) (0.150)
_cons /1.336* /0.653 /1.530*** 0.001 /4.240***
(0.615) (0.505) (0.405) (0.808) (0.499)
N 884 1218 2109 652 2248
Standard6errors6in6parentheses
*6p<0.05 6**6p<0.01 6***6p<0.001
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Table 2.16. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Bolivia 
 
 
  
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections NA NA #0.010 0.105 0.017 0.068
(0.037) (0.0555) (0.047) (0.049)
Satisfaction,with #0.023 #0.064 0.0270 #0.074 #0.0119 #0.124
Democracy (0.084) (0.121) (0.079) (0.115) (0.106) (0.114)
Respect,for,Institutions #0.008 #0.051 #0.009 #0.018 #0.019 #0.044
(0.034) (0.051) (0.036) (0.054) (0.043) (0.049)
Gender #0.0603 0.299 0.0418 0.0400 #0.412** #0.354*
(0.112) (0.166) (0.113) (0.152) (0.137) (0.147)
Age 1.299*** 0.321*** 0.968*** 0.492*** 1.245*** 1.794***
(0.065) (0.079) (0.059) (0.073) (0.080) (0.088)
Income 0.022 0.012 #0.015 0.060 0.005 0.013
(0.046) (0.070) (0.035) (0.044) (0.018) (0.020)
Education 0.694*** 0.304** 0.754*** 0.290** 0.609*** 0.511***
(0.084) (0.112) (0.082) (0.112) (0.105) (0.105)
Employment,status 0.499*** #0.0821 0.486*** 0.487** 0.698*** 0.775***
(0.113) (0.173) (0.114) (0.155) (0.140) (0.150)
Party,Identification NA2 NA 0.479*** 0.358* 0.0833 0.760***
(0.129) (0.165) (0.193) (0.171)
_cons #3.333*** 1.175* #2.987*** #0.365 #2.425*** #4.240***
(0.347) (0.510) (0.378) (0.505) (0.455) (0.499)
N 2578 2032 2315 2297 2290 2248
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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 Table 2.17. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Mexico 
 
 
  
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Trust,in,Elections 0.077 NA &0.003 0.081* 0.069 0.071
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.066) (0.047)
Satisfaction,with &0.083 &0.136 &0.032 &0.074 0.067 0.019
Democracy (0.109) (0.114) (0.110) (0.097) (0.164) (0.113)
Respect,in,Institutions 0.007 0.110* 0.050 0.079* &0.066 &0.043
(0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040) (0.065) (0.045)
Education 0.228** 0.243** 0.163 0.556*** 0.367* 0.303*
(0.086) (0.092) (0.088) (0.114) (0.186) (0.126)
Income 0.036 0.066 &0.009 &0.020 0.055 &0.012
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.020)
Age 0.994*** 1.292*** 0.573*** 0.968*** 0.993*** 0.669***
(0.081) (0.092) (0.070) (0.075) (0.111) (0.075)
Gender &0.0709 &0.380* &0.381* &0.526*** &0.852*** &0.144
(0.141) (0.152) (0.167) (0.155) (0.251) (0.161)
Party,Identification NA 0.647*** 1.146*** 0.609*** 1.160*** 0.338
(0.151) (0.192) (0.165) (0.243) (0.183)
Employment,Status NA NA 0.307 0.258 0.723** &0.284
(0.168) (0.157) (0.250) (0.169)
_cons &1.971*** &3.219*** &1.013* &2.978*** &3.368*** &1.069*
(0.461) (0.485) (0.427) (0.441) (0.703) (0.456)
N 1341 1197 1241 1295 589 1126
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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 Table 2.18. Logit Model examining the Determinants of Voter Turnout in Colombia 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014
Trust/in/Elections 0.055 0.079* 0.139*** 0.034 0.153*** 0.101* 0.142*** 0.081 0.181** 0.065
(0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.060) (0.041)
Satisfaction/with /0.075 0.0154 0.177 /0.031 0.013 0.039 0.0186 0.109 /0.316* /0.031
Democracy (0.094) (0.099) (0.098) (0.096) (0.100) (0.098) (0.103) (0.109) (0.138) (0.097)
Respect/for/Institutions /0.014 0.023 /0.065 /0.019 0.074 0.016 0.021 0.024 /0.015 /0.038
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.055) (0.035)
Gender /0.124 0.350** 0.057 /0.191 /0.187 /0.224 /0.259 /0.427** /0.311 /0.441**
(0.132) (0.131) (0.129) (0.139) (0.151) (0.145) (0.142) (0.147) (0.191) (0.138)
Age 0.759*** 0.827*** 0.361*** 0.533*** 0.685*** 0.837*** 1.020*** 0.718*** 0.394*** 0.927***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.065) (0.068) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) (0.079) (0.067)
Income /0.025 /0.049 /0.032 0.0757 /0.124** /0.083 0.029 0.020 0.052* /0.051**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.026) (0.017)
Education 0.389*** 0.447*** 0.353*** 0.174 0.436*** 0.419*** 0.156 0.389*** /0.0173 0.461***
(0.110) (0.112) (0.105) (0.115) (0.115) (0.108) (0.113) (0.112) (0.134) (0.110)
Party/Identification NA NA 0.799*** 1.210*** 0.692*** 0.450** 0.449** 0.889*** 0.207 0.419**
(0.153) (0.169) (0.168) (0.167) (0.145) (0.178) (0.225) (0.146)
Employment/Status NA NA NA NA 0.334* 0.488*** 0.572*** 0.462** 0.282 0.515***
(0.155) (0.148) (0.145) (0.149) (0.198) (0.144)
_cons /1.591*** /2.699*** /2.010*** /1.580*** /2.640*** /2.792*** /3.546*** /2.700*** /0.823 /2.468***
(0.412) (0.423) (0.412) (0.404) (0.461) (0.435) (0.464) (0.470) (0.571) (0.402)
N 1201 1196 1105 1078 1099 1154 1219 1209 584 1293
NA2=2Question2not2Asked
Standard2errors2in2parentheses
*2p<0.05 2**2p<0.01 2***2p<0.001
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Taken together, the results from the above tables show that the affect variables account for 
variation in voter turnout in all of the countries (at least for one of the survey years), except for 
Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay. Trust in elections has the highest explanatory power throughout the 
region, remaining statistically significant in 11 of the 18 countries and with an effect in the 
expected direction. Specifically, the variable is significant in Guyana (2009 and 2010), 
Venezuela (2007, 2012 and 2014), Panama (2004, 2008 and 2012), Nicaragua (2010, 2012 and 
2014), Honduras (2010 and 2014), El Salvador (2006, 2010 and 2014), Ecuador (2012), Costa 
Rica (2004 and 2006), Chile (2014), Mexico (2010) and Colombia (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 
2010 and 2012). 
Table 3 summarizes this information. As hypothesized, in these countries, citizens who 
perceive that elections are a trustworthy instrument of the democratic system are more likely to 
go to the polls. This finding is in line with previous studies (Birch, 2010; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 
2013).  
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Table 3. Total years in which Trust in Elections is statistically significant                                 
in each country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Countries in which Trust in Elections is statistically significant are highlighted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
     
  Possitive coeff.(years) 
  
 Negative coeff.(years) 
Signif. Non Signif. Signif.. Non Signif. 
ARGENTINA  1  3 
BOLIVIA  3  1 
BRAZIL  5   
COLOMBIA 6 4   
COSTA RICA 2 4   
VENEZUELA 3 2   
CHILE 1 2  1 
URUGUAY  4  1 
MEXICO 1 3  1 
ECUADOR 1 3  2 
EL SALVADOR 3 2  1 
GUATEMALA  5  1 
HONDURAS 2 1  3 
NICARAGUA 3 1  2 
PANAMA 3 2  1 
PERU  3  2 
GUYANA 2 3   
PARAGUAY  4  1 
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Table 4. First Differences in predicted probabilities for a change in Trust 
in Elections from “not at all” to “a lot” 
Country Year Diff. In Pred. Prob. 
EL SALVADOR 2006 0.14 (0.03 - 0.24) 
 2010 0.09 (0.01 - 0.18) 
 2014 0.12 (0.03 – 0.20) 
COSTA RICA 2004 0.20 (0.12 - 0.29) 
 2006 0.20 (0.12 - 0.28) 
VENEZUELA 2007 0.16 (0.06 – 0.26) 
 2012 0.11 (0.01 – 0.26) 
 2014 0.10 (0.23 – 0.17) 
NICARAGUA 2010 0.09 (0.01 – 0.16) 
 2012 0.08 (0.03 – 0.14) 
 2014 0.14 (0.06 – 0.22) 
HONDURAS 2010 0.24 (0.11 – 0.36) 
 2014 0.11 (0.04 – 0.18) 
GUYANA 2009 0.08 (0.01 – 0.14) 
 2010 0.23 (0.14 – 0.32) 
GUATEMALA 2004 0.10 (0.01 – 0.19) 
 2012 0.16 (0.03 – 0.30) 
PANAMA 2004 0.07 (0.00 – 0.14) 
 2008 0.14 (0.04 -  0.22) 
 2012 0.16 (0.01 – 0.28) 
ECUADOR 2012 0.08 (0.00 – 0.17) 
CHILE 2014 0.28 (0.15 – 0.40) 
MEXICO 2010  0.09 (0.004 – 0.18) 
COLOMBIA 2005 0.10 (0.01 – 0.20) 
 2006 0.20 (0.08 – 0.30) 
 2008 0.20 (0.09 – 0.29) 
 2009 0.13 (0.03 – 0.24) 
 2010 0.19 (0.09 – 0.30) 
 2012 0.25 (0.09 – 0.39) 
Note: 95% CI´s in parentheses 
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To have a better understanding of the substantive effect of this variable, Table 4 lists 
simulated differences in predicted probabilities5 of voting for each country and year in which the 
variable was significant6, while all other variables are held constant at their typical values. The 
effect of the variable ranges between 7% in Panama (2004) and 28% in Chile (2014).  
Figure 4 illustrates this. In Panama, in 2004, citizens with the lowest possible value of trust in 
elections had, on average, a probability of turnout of 0.79, while citizens with the highest 
possible value of trust in elections had, on average, a probability of turnout of 0.86. In turn, in 
Chile (2014) citizens with no trust in elections had, on average, a likelihood of voting of 0.58, 
while those with the highest possible trust in the electoral process had a probability of turnout of 
0.86.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 The differences in predicted probabilities for this study were estimated using the Clarify package (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2001) for Stata.  
6 The predicted probabilities were calculated for a change in trust in elections from “not at all” to a “lot” 
while all other variables are held constant at their mean or modal (for dichotomous variables) values. 
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Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Turnout for different values of Trust in Elections, Panama 
2004 and Chile 2014 
	
	
 
In Colombia the variable has a statistically significant effect for the highest amount of years 
(6) of all of the countries. In 2012 the effect is very big: the difference in the predicted 
probability of voting between people with the highest possible value of trust in elections and 
citizens with no trust at all is 25%. This impact on the likelihood of voting is considerable, since 
a difference of that magnitude could change the electoral fortune of one of the presidential 
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candidates if their supporters show up at the polls, or in turn, if it is those supporting the 
opposition who increasingly vote. In 2006, 2008 and 2010 the effect of the variable is also 
considerable (around 20%), while for the rest of the years the difference in predicted probability 
is closer to 10%.  
As regards the second independent variable - respect for institutions-, its coefficient is 
statistically significant in only four of the countries: Panama (2012), Guatemala (2008, 2012 and 
2014), Costa Rica (2008) and Mexico (2006 and 2010). However, this variable has mixed 
effects: while in Panama and Guatemala (in 2014) it has an unexpected negative sign, in Costa 
Rica, Mexico and Guatemala (for the other 2 years), it has the expected positive effect.  
Table 5 summarizes this information. Thus, while in some countries the results support my 
theoretical expectations concerning the effect of respect for institutions on voter turnout, in 
others they suggest that citizens might be using their vote as a means of showing their lack of 
respect towards institutions.  
In Panama, where the variable has a negative coefficient, trust in elections has a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient for the same year. One possible explanation for these opposite 
effects could be that respondents are not consistent in their answers: while they might claim that 
they have high trust in elections, they might also be answering that they have low respect for 
institutions. On the other hand, it could be the case that both variables are in fact capturing 
different perceptions from the electorate, and that they have independent impacts on turnout 
(Birch, 2010).  
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Table 5. Total years in which Respect for Institutions is statistically significant                                 
in each country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Countries in which Respect for Institutions is statistically significant are highlighted 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
     
Possitive coeff. (years) 
  
     Negative coeff.  (years) 
Signif. Non Signif. Signif.. Non Signif. 
ARGENTINA  1  3 
BOLIVIA    6 
BRAZIL  3  2 
COLOMBIA  5  5 
COSTA RICA 1 3  2 
VENEZUELA  2  3 
CHILE  4  1 
URUGUAY  1  4 
MEXICO 2 2  2 
ECUADOR  2  4 
EL SALVADOR  3  3 
GUATEMALA 2 2 1 1 
HONDURAS  5  1 
NICARAGUA  2  4 
PANAMA  1 1 4 
PERU  2  3 
GUYANA  3  2 
PARAGUAY  4  1 
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   Table 6. First Differences in predicted probabilities for a change in Respect for   
Institutions from “not at all” to “a lot” 
Country Year Diff. In Pred. Prob. 
 
COSTA RICA 2008 0.18 (0.08 - 0.28) 
MEXICO 2006 0.12 (0.03 - 0.22) 
 2010  0.09 (0.001 - 0.18) 
GUATEMALA 2008 0.13 (0.01 - 0.26) 
 2012 0.21 (0.08 - 0.35) 
 2014                   -0.12 (-0.20 - -0.02) 
PANAMA 2012                   -0.17 (-0.30 - -0.04) 
Note: 95% CI´s in parentheses 
 
Table 6 shows the simulated first differences in the predicted probability of voting for a 
change in respect for institutions from “not at all” to “a lot”, for all of the countries and survey 
years in which the variable was statistically significant, while all other variables are held 
constant at their mean or modal (for dichotomous variables) values. The effect of this variable 
ranges between a decrease in the likelihood of turnout of 17% in Panama (2012) and an increase 
of 21% in Guatemala (2012).  
Figure 5 illustrates the predicted probability of voting for different values of respect for 
institutions in Guatemala in the year 2014, when the variable has a negative effect. Now, it is 
citizens who have lower levels of respect for institutions who have a higher probability of 
showing up at the polls on election day. On average, a citizen with no respect for institutions has 
a predicted probability of voting of about 0.78, whereas a citizen with the highest possible level 
of respect for institutions has, on average, a predicted probability of going to the polling station 
of 0.66.  
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Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Turnout for different values of Respect for 
Institutions, Guatemala 2014 
 
Satisfaction with democracy also has mixed effects on voter turnout: in five of the nine 
countries in which the variable is statistically significant (Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Brazil 
and Chile) its coefficient is positive, while in the other four (Panama, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Colombia) it is negative. The variable is statistically significant only for a few of the survey 
years: Argentina in 2008, Uruguay in 2007 and 2014, Panama in 2006, Honduras in 2012, 
Ecuador in 2004, Costa Rica in 2006 and 2010, Chile in 2006, Brazil in 2008 and Colombia in 
2012. These results provide further support to the fact that elections might be working as 
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mechanisms by which citizens are expressing their discontent and dissatisfaction towards the 
political system: holding everything else constant, those who are more dissatisfied with the way 
democracy works in Panama, Ecuador, Colombia and Honduras, have a higher probability of 
turnout than those who are satisfied with the status quo.  
 
Table 7. Total years in which Satisfaction with Democracy is statistically significant                       
in each country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Countries in which Satisfaction with Democracy is statistically significant are highlighted 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
   Possitive coeff. (years) 
      
    Negative coeff. (years) 
Signif. Non Signif. Signif.. Non Signif. 
ARGENTINA 1 1  2 
BOLIVIA  1  5 
BRAZIL 1 2  2 
COLOMBIA  6 1 3 
COSTA RICA 2 2  2 
VENEZUELA  2  3 
CHILE 1 3  1 
URUGUAY 2 2  1 
MEXICO  2  4 
ECUADOR  4 1 1 
EL SALVADOR  2  4 
GUATEMALA  2  4 
HONDURAS  4 1 1 
NICARAGUA  3  3 
PANAMA  1 1 4 
PERU  2  3 
GUYANA  3  2 
PARAGUAY  3  2 
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Table 8. First Differences in predicted probabilities for a change in Satisfaction with 
Democracy from “not at all” to “a lot” 
Country Year Diff. In Pred. Prob. 
 
ARGENTINA 2008 0.14 (0.03 - 0.26) 
BRAZIL 2008 0.10 (0.02 - 0.19) 
COLOMBIA 2012 -0.22 (-0.38 - -0.03) 
COSTA RICA 2006 0.22 (0.05 - 0.40) 
 2010 0.16 (0.02 - 0.29) 
URUGUAY 2007 0.10 (0.01 - 0.25) 
 2014 0.13 (0.05 - 0.22) 
ECUADOR 2004 -0.07 (-0.13 - -0.02) 
CHILE 2006  0.16 (0.04 -  0.28) 
HONDURAS 2012 -0.18 (-0.33 - -0.001) 
PANAMA 2006 -0.13 (-0.24 - -0.02) 
Note: 95% CI´s in parentheses 
 
Table 8 presents the difference in predicted probabilities of voting in each of the countries 
and years in which satisfaction with democracy was significant, when all other variables are held 
at their mean or most frequent values. The simulated predicted probabilities reveal that the effect 
of this variable is between -22% in Colombia (2012) and 22% in Costa Rica (2006).  
Figure 6 shows the predicted probability of turnout for different values of satisfaction with 
democracy in Costa Rica, where the effect of the variable is highest. As expected, all else equal, 
as the level of satisfaction with democracy increases, the probability of turnout increases in both 
2006 and 2010. In the former, citizens with the lowest possible level of satisfaction with 
democracy have, on average, a 0.49 probability of voting, while individuals with the highest 
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possible level of satisfaction have approximately a 0.71 probability of voting. In 2010, the 
magnitude of the effect – while still big – is lower. Citizens very dissatisfied with democracy 
have, on average, a 0.33 probability of turnout, while those with the highest possible level of 
satisfaction have a 0.49 probability.   
Something that should be pointed out is that in Colombia and Panama where the variable has 
a negative effect on the likelihood of turnout, trust in elections has a positive and significant 
effect in that same year. This could be indicating that something else besides affection towards 
political institutions might be driving the level of trust that people have in the electoral process. 
Maybe citizens feel that institutions are more responsive and trustworthy when the party of their 
preference is in power. Thus, it could be the case that citizens that have positive attitudes towards 
the incumbent government have higher overall trust in the electoral process, independently of 
their level of satisfaction with the democratic system. 
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Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Turnout for different values of Satisfaction with Democracy, 
Costa Rica 
 
 
Turning now to the control variables, as expected, citizens with a job and with higher 
education levels also have a higher probability of turnout across the region. On the one hand, 
education is significant in all of the countries and in the expected direction: in three of them 
(Paraguay, Bolivia and Venezuela) for all of the survey years, and in six of them for almost all of 
the survey years (Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico). These results 
support my theoretical expectations concerning the importance of resources for participation. On 
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the other hand, employment status is significant in all of the countries and in the expected 
direction, except Costa Rica. In Argentina, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Panama, the variable is 
significant for all of the survey years, providing strong support for the hypothesis that citizens 
with a job have higher turnout rates in these countries.   
 The results, however, provide scant support for the hypothesis that people with higher 
income tend to vote more across the region. This could be due to the fact that the item used in the 
survey is not a good measurement of the socio-economic level of the individuals in each 
country.7 In addition, it could be the case that most of the impact of the variable is already 
absorbed by other indicators of socio-economic status such as education and occupation. The 
variable remains significant in 11 of the countries8, but for most of them only for one year, with 
the exception of Colombia in which it is significant three years and Paraguay where it is 
significant all years. In Peru, and Colombia (for two out of the three years) the variable is 
wrongly signed, suggesting that citizens with higher income levels have a lower probability of 
turnout than those with lower income.  
As expected, party identification is a strong predictor of turnout across the region: it is 
significant in 15 of the 18 countries and its coefficient is in the expected direction in all of the 
                                                
7 In order to account for this possibility, I also measured income using the possession of a car by the 
respondent and run all of the models again. However, the variable still remained a weak predictor of 
turnout across the countries.  
8 These countries are: Argentina (2012), Venezuela (2010), Uruguay (2007), Peru (2008), Honduras 
(2006), Guatemala (2012), Ecuador (2014), Costa Rica (2004 and 2010), Colombia (2008, 2012, 2014), 
Brazil (2007), and Paraguay (from 2006 to 2014). 	
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cases. In 8 of the countries9 it was significant in each of the years in which the survey was 
conducted. These results are in line with recent cross-national research in the region (Carlin and 
Love, 2015; Carreras and Castaneda-Angarita, 2013) and with most of the comparative research 
on individual-level turnout (Smets and van Ham, 2013). The only three countries in which the 
effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero consistently throughout all of the years in 
which the survey was administered are Uruguay, Peru and Paraguay.10 In addition, as expected, 
the youngest citizens are less likely to vote than the rest of the population. Age is the strongest 
predictor of turnout and the most consistent across the region: it is significant and in the expected 
direction in all of the countries and for all the survey years, except in Argentina where it is only 
significant two years (2010 and 2014), Paraguay where it is only significant for a year, and 
Ecuador and Chile where it is significant for all of the years except one. This confirms the 
findings of previous studies in the region (Carlin and Love, 2015; Carreras and Castañeda-
Angarita, 2013; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013).  
Finally, gender is significant in all of the countries except Chile and, as hypothesized, in 15 
of them the coefficient of the variable is negative: women have a higher probability of voting 
than men. This provides evidence against the existence of a gender gap in participation across the 
region. However, it is important to point out that the variable was a strong predictor of turnout 
                                                
9 These countries are: Guyana, Venezuela, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and 
Chile.	
10 I estimated the models for these countries without including Satisfaction with Democracy to see if this 
variable was driving the effect of party identification. In Uruguay and Peru the variable still remained 
statistically insignificant across all of the survey years. However, in Paraguay it was statistically 
significant for all of the years in which it was included in the survey.  
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for just one year in four of the countries (El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua). Paraguay 
is the only country where the variable was statistically significant for all survey years. It could be 
argued that this higher probability of turnout among women is the result of the increasing 
representation of women in government offices throughout the region. However, this effect 
should not be overestimated, as empirical evidence supporting this relationship is mixed 
(Desposato and Norrander, 2009; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011).  
 
Examining better the effect of trust in elections on turnout 
The above analysis indicates that trust in elections is the strongest predictor of turnout among 
the independent variables of interest: it is significant in 11 countries and always in the expected 
direction. To have a better understanding of the effect of this variable, Table 9 presents the 
coefficient estimates from a logistic model that pools all the data of all the countries and years 
together, with the corresponding standard errors clustered by country.11  Model 1 only 
incorporates trust in elections as a predictor, while Model 2 also includes the individual-level 
control variables. However, both models exclude the other two independent variables. Even 
though both models have heterogeneity problems, this is the best way to present a summarized 
version of the results for all countries and years.12 
                                                11	 There are strong reasons to believe that the errors are correlated inside each country and by not 
clustering them, the estimates of the variance-covariance matrices will be inefficient.   	
12 I also estimated other model specifications and the results remained robust. These alternative models 
can be found in the appendix.  
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Table 9. The effect of Trust in Elections on Voter Turnout in Latin America.                                  
Logistic Regression, pooled data 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Trust in Elections 0.089*** 
(0.015) 
0.071*** 
(0.013) 
Age  0.053*** 
(0.004) 
Gender  -0.279*** 
(0.041) 
Employment Status  0.604*** 
(0.049) 
Party Identification  0.642*** 
(0.085) 
Education  0.395*** 
(0.085) 
 
Income  -0.010 
(0.013) 
Constant 0.848*** 
(0.129) 
-1.966*** 
(0.206) 
N 141,689 90,281 
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by country are shown in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Taken together, the results from Table 9 show that trust in elections is a significant predictor 
of voter turnout in Latin America and in the expected direction. As Model 2 indicates, the 
variable remains statistically significant after accounting for the effect of individual socio-
demographic variables. As hypothesized, citizens who perceive that elections are a trustworthy 
instrument of the democratic system are more likely to go to the polls. This finding is in line with 
previous studies in the region (McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013). In 
addition, as expected, employment status and education have a positive and statistically 
significant effect: citizens with a job and with higher education levels have a higher probability 
of turnout across the region. These results support the theoretical expectations concerning the 
importance of individual resources for participation.   
Party identification has a statistically significant effect on turnout across the countries and its 
coefficient is in the hypothesized direction. Furthermore, age also has a statistically significant 
effect and in the expected direction: older citizens are more likely to vote. The results again 
provide scant support for the hypothesis that people with higher income tend to vote more across 
the region. As argued previously, this could be due to the fact that the item used in the survey is 
not a good measurement of the respondents’ socio-economic level. Furthermore, it could be the 
case that most of the impact of the variable is already absorbed by other indicators of socio-
economic status such as education and occupation. 
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Finally, gender has a statistically significant and negative coefficient. Because of the way the 
variable is coded (1=male) a negative coefficient indicates that, as hypothesized, women tend to 
have a higher likelihood of turnout than men, as the results in the previous section also showed. 
Table 10 summarizes the results from the logistic regressions examining the effect of trust in 
elections on voter turnout for each of the individual countries.13 Since the models are nonlinear, 
the estimates only provide information about the direction and the statistical significance of the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Thus, to have a better 
understanding of the substantive effect of trust in elections on turnout, Columns 2 to 7 include 
first differences in predicted probabilities for each wave of the survey14 (with the corresponding 
95% confidence intervals in parentheses), and indicate whether the variable was statistically 
significant or not. In addition, the last two columns summarize the lowest and highest effect of 
the independent variable in each country.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 The results of the regressions including the control variables for each country and each wave of the 
survey can be obtained upon request to the author.   
14 These were calculated using the Clarify software (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2001) in Stata. I 
estimated the first differences in the predicted probability of voting for a change in trust in elections from 
“not at all” to “a lot” for each survey year, while all other variables were held constant at their mean 
values.  
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Table 10. The effect of  Trust in Elections on voter turnout in Latin America. Summary of results 
Country 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Min 
Effect 
Max 
Effect 
Argentina NA NA 0%                    
(-.089 -  .08) 
 
-2%                   
(-.11 -   
.056) 
 
1%                  
(-.05 - .06) 
 
-2%                   
(-.094 - .058) 
 
-2% 
 
1% 
 
Bolivia QNA QNA -1%                  
(-.07 - .056) 
 
5%                  
(-.001 - 
.090) 
 
1%                  
(-..035 - 
.052) 
 
2%                   
(-.033 - .068) 
 
-1% 
 
5% 
 
Brazil NA NA 3%                    
( - .021 - .096) 
 
5%                 
(.005 - 
.096) 
 
4%                  
(-.014 - .086) 
 
2%                   
(-.031 - .064) 
 
2% 
 
5% 
 
Chile NA QNA 9%                   
(-.007 - .189) 
 
7%                    
(.006 - 
.149) 
 
7%                  
(-.025 - .172) 
 
30%                   
(.179 - .406) 
 
7% 
 
30% 
 
Colombia 5%                  
(-.026 - .137) 
 
18%                  
(.086 - .275) 
 
20%               
(.106 - .298) 
 
21%                   
(.119 - 
.299) 
 
20%               
(.103 - .289) 
 
7%                     
(-.034 - .168) 
 
5% 
 
21% 
 
Costa Rica 23%                  
(.149 - .309) 
 
23%                     
(.15 - .304) 
 
10%                
(.017 - .182) 
 
7%                    
(-.037 - 
.167) 
 
8%                  
(-.008 - .174) 
 
5%                    
(-.028 - .151) 
 
5% 
 
23% 
 
Ecuador -1%                 
(-.045 - .033) 
 
2%                    
(-.0155 - 
.062) 
 
1%                   
(-.033 - .044) 
 
1%                   
(-.020 - 
.050) 
 
3%                  
(-.016 - .088) 
 
-1%                  
(-.048 - .035) 
 
-1% 
 
3% 
 
El Salvador 5%                  
(-.012 - .12) 
 
13%                  
(.034 - .230) 
 
8%                        
(-.000 - .157) 
 
9%                    
(.013 - 
.157) 
 
6%                  
(-.030 - .152) 
 
11%                     
(.04 - .19) 
 
5% 
 
13% 
 
Guatemala 9%                   
(.012 - .178) 
 
3%                    
(-.081 - .15) 
 
1%                    
(-.069 - .085) 
 
4%                  
(-.052 - 
.133) 
 
13%               
(.045 - .209) 
 
3%                    
(-.040 - .110) 
 
1% 
 
13% 
 
Guyana NA 
 
7%                    
(.007 - .140) 
 
NA 
 
19%                 
(.109 - 
.269) 
 
7%                  
(-.012 - .141) 
 
3%                    
(-.049 - .098) 
 
3% 
 
19% 
 
Honduras 1%                   
(- .063 - 
.075) 
 
3%                    
( -.036 -  
.089) 
 
-3%                  
(-.16 -  .095) 
 
25%                      
( .124 - 
.357) 
 
11%                
( -.003 - 
.226) 
 
10%                       
(  .03 - .165) 
 
-3% 
 
25% 
 
Notes: NA= Survey not Administered 
QNA= Question not Asked 
Cells in bold indicate that trust in elections is statistically significant; 95% CI’s are shown in parentheses 
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Table 10 (cont’d) 
Country 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Min 
Effect 
Max 
Effect 
Nicaragua 3%                   
( -.043 -  
.091) 
 
-1%                  
( -.106 - 
.08) 
 
-1%                  
( -.086 - 
.060) 
 
6%                    
( -.018 - 
.125) 
 
10%                      
( .049 - 
.153) 
 
14%                
(.069 - 
.211) 
 
-1% 
 
14% 
 
Panama 6%                   
(-.003 -  
.119) 
 
-5%                  
(-.132 - 
.028) 
 
12%                      
( .036 -
.199) 
 
7%                     
( .006 - 
.152) 
 
3%                   
( -.056 - 
.118) 
 
5%                    
( -.028 - 
.134) 
 
-5%
 
12% 
 
Paraguay NA 
 
14%                       
( .040 - 
.24) 
 
-4%               
(-.158 - 
.062) 
 
10%                 
( .006 - 
.184) 
 
-3%                    
( -.130 - 
.064) 
 
4%                    
(-.033 - 
.107) 
 
-4%
 
14% 
 
Peru NA 
 
-2%                  
( -.072 - 
.031) 
 
-0.20%             
( -.044 - 
.036) 
 
-0.40%             
( -.068 - 
.056) 
 
2%                    
( -.039 -
.074) 
 
-2%                  
(-.076 - 
.035) 
 
-0.4% 
 
2% 
 
Uruguay NA 
 
NA 
 
-1%                   
( -.033 - 
.031) 
 
3%                   
( -.009 - 
.092) 
 
4%                    
( -.001 - 
.098) 
 
6%                          
( .011 - 
.130) 
 
-1%
 
6% 
 
Venezuela NA 
 
NA 
 
7%                         
( .006 - 
.135) 
 
10%                  
(  .018 - 
.183) 
 
12%            
(.033 - 
.219) 
 
4%                         
( .001 - 
.079) 
 
4%
 
12% 
 
Mexico 5%                  
(-.014 - 
.126) 
 
NA 
 
1%                    
( -.056 - 
.086) 
 
10%                   
(.023 - 
.187) 
 
5%                   
( -.043 - 
.145) 
 
5%                      
( -.038 - 
.129) 
 
1% 
 
10% 
 
Notes: NA= Survey not Administered 
QNA= Question not Asked  
Cells in bold indicate that trust in elections is statistically significant; 95% CI’s are shown in parentheses 
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As Table 10 shows, trust in elections remains a significant predictor of voter turnout in 14 of 
the 18 countries included in the study, and in all of them in the expected positive direction. Thus, 
by eliminating the other two independent variables from the model, the impact of trust in 
elections across the region increases. Its effect presents variation both within and between 
countries throughout the years. Specifically, the effect of the variable ranges between a minimum 
of 4% in Venezuela (2014) and a maximum of 30% in Chile (2014).  
The results seem to indicate that the effect of trust in elections on turnout is contingent on 
compulsory voting.15 Argentina, Peru and Ecuador, where the variable is not statistically 
significant, have compulsory voting laws that are enforced. Furthermore, in Brazil and Uruguay, 
where the variable is statistically significant only one year and its effect exhibits less variation 
across the years, voting is mandatory and enforced as well. Mexico and Paraguay, where the 
variable is statistically significant only one year, also have compulsory voting laws.16 In addition, 
in Colombia, Venezuela, and El Salvador, where voting is not compulsory, the effect of trust in 
elections is statistically distinguishable from zero for almost all or all survey years. Thus, 
citizens’ confidence in the electoral process remains a stronger determinant of turnout in 
countries where voting is not mandatory.  
                                                15	In addition, I estimated a mixed-effects logistic regression including an interaction term between trust 
in elections (an individual-level variable) and compulsory voting (a country-level variable). The 
coefficient for the interaction term was negative and statistically significant, indicating that the effect of 
trust in elections on voter turnout is higher in countries without compulsory voting laws. These results can 
be found in the appendix.  
16 Costa Rica and Honduras also have compulsory voting laws but they are not enforced and the effect of 
trust in elections on the likelihood of turnout remains high.  
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These findings are in line with the literature on voter turnout in Latin America (Carlin and 
Love 2015; Fornos et al. 2004; Pérez-Liñán 2001), which has shown that countries where voting 
is compulsory and sanctions for non-voting are enforced, turnout tends to be higher. When 
voting is compulsory, the explanatory power of trust in elections decreases, as voting “is easy, 
common, and legally coerced” (Carlin and Love 2015: 51) and voters become less dependent on 
their internal motivation to vote. In turn, when voting is voluntary, citizens have to rely more 
heavily in this internal motivation in order to show up at the polls and the impact of citizens’ 
confidence in the electoral process is stronger. In addition, in their study of the impact of trust in 
elections on voter turnout in Latin America for the year 2010, Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) also 
concluded that “trust in elections is a much stronger predictor of electoral participation in 
countries where compulsory voting laws do not exist” (Carreras and İrepoğlu 2013: 617).  
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CONCLUSION 
In this study, I explore the relevance of citizens’ attitudes and perceptions towards political 
institutions for explaining electoral participation in Latin America. Specifically, I analyze the 
impact of trust in elections, satisfaction with democracy, and respect for institutions. The 
empirical results do not show that these variables are uniformly better at explaining turnout in 
the region than socio-demographic characteristics, but they have a significant effect on voter 
turnout in individual countries. The analysis reveals that trust in elections is the strongest 
predictor of turnout among the independent variables of interest: it is significant in 11 countries 
and always in the expected direction. The empirical results indicate that this variable has a 
significant effect on voter turnout across the region and throughout the years, especially in those 
countries without compulsory voting laws. 
The study also shows that satisfaction with democracy and respect for institutions have 
mixed effects: in some cases they increase the likelihood of voting, but in others they act in the 
opposite direction. I provide an alternative explanation for these results: citizens use elections as 
a way of engaging in the political process, to express their discontent, lack of respect and their 
dissatisfaction with the political system. This finding is in line with Power and Garand’s (2007) 
study, which argues that political discontent matters for invalid voting in Latin America. In 
addition, recent work by Cantu and Garcia-Ponce (2015) in Mexico shows that citizens with low 
evaluations of electoral integrity still show up at the polling station. In a region where voting is 
compulsory in most of the countries, citizens with lower levels of affection towards political 
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institutions do not necessarily abstain. Instead, they can show up at the poll booth and spoil their 
ballots or choose to vote for the opposition candidate. Future studies could, thus, look at the 
effect that discontent has on vote choice.  
The analysis also reveals that the individual level socio-demographic variables that explain 
voter turnout in the industrialized world have explanatory power in Latin America as well. As 
expected, older, educated and employed citizens have higher probabilities of voting. And, as 
hypothesized, women tend to vote more than men across the region. Age, a proxy for the level of 
political experience of citizens, is the strongest predictor of turnout and the most consistent 
across the region. In addition, party identification is also one of the most important predictors of 
voter turnout. However, contrary to the expectations of the resource model of participation, there 
is little evidence that citizens with higher income tend to vote more in the region. This could be 
due to the fact that other variables like employment status and level of education might be 
driving the effect of socio-economic status on participation. Altogether, these findings challenge 
the conventional wisdom on electoral participation in the region which argues that “voter turnout 
in Latin America is largely driven by institutional and political process variables, with 
socioeconomic variables having a surprisingly small effect” (Fornos et al., 2004: 934).  
Given that the results indicate the need to take into account citizens’ trust towards the 
electoral process for explaining variations in turnout, further research might also examine the 
determinants of this trust in the region. When the party that citizens prefer is in power, they 
might feel that institutions are more responsive and trustworthy. In line with this, Cantu and 
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Garcia-Ponce (2015) find evidence of partisan effects on attitudes towards the electoral process 
in the 2012 Mexican presidential elections. Supporters of the incumbent party had lower levels 
of confidence on the integrity of the electoral process once they learned that their preferred 
candidate lost, whereas the discredit about this process among supporters of a party that had 
never won the elections remained consistent over time. Thus, it could be the case that the 
questions about citizens’ attitudes and perceptions towards political institutions in the LAPOP 
survey are capturing attitudes towards the incumbent government. In other words, citizens’ 
attitudes towards the incumbent government could be a strong predictor of their level of trust in 
the electoral process. There is a question in the LAPOP survey that measures the former: 
“speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of 
(name current president)?”. The answers are coded in a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very good” 
and 5 is “very bad”. Future studies could thus estimate the relation between perceptions of 
government performance and trust in elections. In fact, I estimated an ordered logit model in 
Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela with trust in elections as the dependent variable and 
government performance as the main independent variable together with individual socio-
demographic covariates. This gave statistically significant results across all of the years in which 
the survey was administered for these countries.   
The results of the present study have an important policy implication. Given that trust in the 
electoral process has a significant impact on voter turnout, governments and nongovernmental 
organizations throughout the region should focus on the quality of the electoral process if their 
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goal is to increase electoral participation. In countries where this process has already started, 
governments should continue in this direction. In others, politicians should focus their efforts in 
combating electoral malpractices and introducing the necessary institutional changes to 
guarantee free and fair elections. This is an important task if governments are committed to 
improving the quality of the vote and of democracy in the region. 
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APPENDIX 
Operationalization of Control Variables 
Variables Survey Items 
 
Age Recoded into 1= 16-23; 2= 24-33; 3= 34-48;  4= 49-64;          
5= 65 and older 
 
Gender Recoded into 1 = male, 0 = female 
 
Employment Status How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently: 
1) Working? 
2) Not working, but have a job? 
3) Actively looking for a job? 
4) A student? 
5) Taking care of the home? 
6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to 
work 
7) Not working and not looking for a job? 
Recoded into 1= working (options 1&2), 0= not working 
(all other options) 
 
Education How many years of schooling have you completed? 
Scale from 0 to over 18. Recoded into 0= no education, 
1= primary school, 2= secondary school, 3= higher 
education 
 
Party Identification Do you currently identify with a political part? 
Recoded into 1= yes, 0= no 
 
Income Into which of the following income ranges does the total 
monthly income of this household fit, including 
remittances from abroad and the income of all the 
working adults and children? [Deciles based on the 
currency and distribution of the country, and updated 
throughout the survey years for each country] 
0= no income, maximum category varies by country 
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Table 11. Robustness Checks: Alternative Model Specifications 
 Model 1 
 (Random 
Effects logistic 
regression) 
Model 2 
(Logistic 
regression 
w/dummy 
variables for 
country) 
 
Model 3 
 (Logistic 
regression 
w/dummy 
variables for 
country and 
year) 
Trust in 
Elections 
0.063*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.063*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.062*** 
(0.005) 
 
Age 0.054*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.054*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.054*** 
(0.001) 
 
Gender -0.282** 
(0.019) 
 
-0.282*** 
(0.019) 
 
-0.283*** 
(0.019) 
 
Employment 
Status 
0.591*** 
(0.019) 
 
0.591*** 
(0.019) 
 
0.589*** 
(0.019) 
 
Party 
Identification 
0.764*** 
(0.021) 
 
0.764*** 
(0.021) 
 
0.765*** 
(0.021) 
 
Education 0.334*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.334*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.330*** 
(0.014) 
 
Income -0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 
Constant -1.936*** 
(0.131) 
 
-2.035*** 
(0.058) 
 
-2.083*** 
(0.061) 
 
N 90,281 
 
90,281 
 
90,281 
 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Estimates of the year and country dummies are not reported but are                                 
available upon request to the author 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 12. Determinants of Voter Turnout in Latin America. Mixed-Effects 
(Random Intercept) Logistic Regression. 
Variables 
 
Random Intercept Model 
 
Trust in Elections 0.090*** 
(0.013) 
 
Age 0.055*** 
(0.004) 
 
Gender -0.285*** 
(0.044) 
 
Employment Status 0.599*** 
(0.050) 
 
Party Identification 0.748*** 
(0.081) 
 
Education 0.361*** 
(0.032) 
 
Income -0.007 
(0.011) 
 
Country-Level variable: 
 
Compulsory Voting17 
 
0.663*** 
(0.077) 
 
Compulsory Voting * Trust in Elections -0.043** 
(0.015) 
 
Constant -2.514*** 
(0.165) 
 
Random Effects intercept 0.101*** 
(0.00779) 
 
N 9,0281 
 
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by country are shown in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
                                                
17 This variable measures whether voting is compulsory (1) or voluntary (0)  (International Idea).  
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